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Abstract: This paper discusses the relation 
between Kant’s doctrine of pure appercep-
tion (the doctrine of the “I think”) and Fichte’s 
theory of self-positing. It shows that Kant’s 
conception of the transcendental unity of 
apperception is closer to Fichte’s principle 
of self-positing than is usually thought, and 
that Kant’s “I think,” and not Reinhold’s 
“principle of consciousness”, may have been 
a source of inspiration for Fichte in his at-
tempt to justify transcendental idealism. As 
in Kant, in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, the 
activity of “self-positing” is the fundamen-
tal feature of the I-hood. Similar to Kant, in 
Fichte, too, the fi rst principle expresses a pe-
culiar kind of unity, which he calls the original 
unity of self-consciousness (Tathandlung). 
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Resumen: El presente artículo discute la 
cuestión de la relación entre la doctrina kan-
tiana de la apercepción pura (la doctrina del 
“Yo pienso”) y la teoría fi chteana de la auto-
posición. Se mostrará que la concepción 
kantiana de la unidad transcendental de la 
apercepción se halla más cerca del principio 
fi chteano de la auto-posición de lo que se 
suele pensar y que la fuente de inspiración 
para la justifi cación que hace Fichte del idea-
lismo transcendental es el Yo pienso kantiano 
y no el “principio de consciencia” de Reinhold. 
En la doctrina de la ciencia de Fichte, al igual 
que en Kant, la actividad de la auto-posición 
es la característica fundamental de la Yoidad. 
Al igual que Kant, Fichte entiende que el pri-
mer principio expresa un tipo particular de 
unidad que él llama unidad originaria de la 
autoconsciencia (Tathandlung). 
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O ne of the central issues in post-Kantian philosophy is the issue of self-consciousness. What is under consideration is the meaning and systematic function of self-consciousness 
that would not only clarify the dynamics of mental states, but, to an 
even greater extent, also legitimize the systematic grounding of philos-
ophy in the I and explain the very possibility of a subject. The notion 
that the Critical philosophy needed completion has its origin in the 
perceived inadequacy of Kant to provide a unifi ed structure for cogni-
tion. The early debates that undoubtedly had a defi ning signifi cance in 
the development of post-Kantian idealism (here I have in mind the de-
bates initiated and successfully carried out by Reinhold, Maimon, and 
Schulze) clearly identifi ed the problem and the urgent need to respond 
to it. It was Fichte who took it upon himself to provide a new founda-
tion for the transcendental philosophy. Fichte claimed to remain true 
to the spirit, if not the letter, of Kant’s thought when he, following 
Reinhold, argued that philosophy must begin with a fi rst principle. 
Yet contrary to Reinhold, who appealed to a fact (Tatsache) of con-
sciousness, Fichte insisted that this principle must express a fact/act 
(Tathandlung), which is known not empirically, but with self-evident 
certainty. This newly found fi rst principle was associated with the I, or, 
more specifi cally, with the principle of the self-positing I. 
In this paper, I am interested in exploring the question of the 
extent to which Kant’s concept of self-consciousness and thinking 
subject (or what Kant discusses under the notion of “apperception”) 
infl uenced Fichte’s conception of the I and what is the role that 
Kant’s account of the “I think” plays in the highest principle of 
the Wissenschaftslehre. For many scholars, the difference in the two 
thinkers’ takes on the issue of intellectual intuition casts doubt on 
the real signifi cance of such relation, if not on the possibility of such 
a relation itself. Although it is true that Kant denies the possibility of 
intellectual intuition, while Fichte clearly endorses it, this does not 
prove the perceived disagreement of their arguments. Furthermore, 
Fichte himself hints at an explicit connection between his theory of 
self-positing and Kant’s doctrine of pure apperception.1
1. J. G. FICHTE, Fichtes Werke, 11 vols. (De Gruyter, Berlin, 1971) vol. I, 475ff. 
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In my paper, I will examine this connection, while also com-
menting on important differences. I will show that, in his develop-
ment of the principle of the self-positing I, Fichte builds on Kant’s 
“pure apperception,” which he believes had the potential to unite 
sensibility and conceptuality (intuitions and concepts). Yet Kant, he 
argued, had not made the most of this.2 I further suggest that Kant’s 
conception of the transcendental unity of apperception is closer to 
Fichte’s principle of self-positing than it is usually thought, and that 
Kant’s “I think,” and not Reinhold’s “principle of consciousness,”—
as many commentators believe—may have been a source of inspi-
ration for Fichte in his attempt to fi nd a plausible justifi cation for 
transcendental idealism. 
As in Kant, for whom the principle “I think” refers to the most 
fundamental function of thinking (cognitive activity as such), in 
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, the activity of “self-positing” is the funda-
mental feature of the I-hood. In fact, Fichte takes the position, which 
had already been presented by Kant, that the concept of self-con-
sciousness contains the thought of a groundless subject spontaneously 
generating knowledge of its own existence. And also similar to Kant, 
in Fichte the fi rst principle expresses a peculiar kind of unity, which 
he calls the original unity of self-consciousness (Tathandlung). This is 
a unity presupposed by and contained within every fact and every act 
of empirical consciousness, though it never appears as such therein. 
I will start with a discussion of Kant’s account of the transcendental 
unity of apperception, then I will proceed to Fichte’s principle of the 
self-positing I, and fi nally, I will draw some conclusions based on the 
results of the offered discussion.
1. KANT AND THE UNITY OF APPERCEPTION
The most famous and yet perhaps most puzzling sentence in the 
whole Critique of Pure Reason appears in the opening section of the 
“Transcendental Deduction” in the second edition: 
(hecenforth quoted as SW volume: page number(s)).
2. SW I: 472.
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The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; 
for otherwise something would be represented in me that 
could not be thought at all. Which is as much as to say that the 
representation would either be impossible or else at least would 
be nothing to me.3 
This passage introduces Kant’s principle of the transcendental 
unity of apperception. The common interpretation of Kant’s view 
here is that unless representations were such that at some point 
the thought “I think” could accompany them, then they would be 
nothing to me at all, or again would not be mine. And to say that 
the thought “I think” can accompany them is to say that they are 
bound together in some way by my own cognitive activity. This 
“binding together” is what makes it possible to think them under 
concepts, as combined in judgments, and as accompanied by the 
thought “I think.”4 But there is much more to the Kant’s statement 
than what is explained above. 
For example, neither the defi nition of apperception itself nor 
how it is related to the “I think” is clear. The logical status of the 
principle also needs explanation, for instance, a response to the 
question of why the “I think” plays such an important role.
Kant’s account of the transcendental unity of apperception is a 
central element in his Critical philosophy. The prospect which Kant 
offers in the Critique of Pure Reason is of a constitutive connection 
between our rational activity and experience of an objective world. 
What bridges these two realms is the transcendental unity of ap-
perception as the condition for the possibility of knowledge. From 
the simple fact that we are aware of ourselves (or self-conscious 
about our existence and our experience of the world) there follows 
the objective validity of the categories, and hence the existence of 
a causally structured spatial-temporal world of mind-independent 
3. I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason (further: CPR), translated and edited by Paul 
Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998) B131-
132.
4. See B. LONGUENESSE, Kant on the Identity of Persons, “Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society” 107 (1pt2) (2007) 151-152. 
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objects. But the subject is not just of pure epistemic interest. What 
often gets lost in philosophical debates about Kant’s account of the 
unity of apperception is that this is ultimately the transcendental 
self, i.e., the “I” which is my “identity” and which lies behind all 
my changing experience as something which remains the “same.” 
In other words, the problems that Kant attempts to solve with the 
principle of the transcendental unity of apperception are central to 
philosophy of subjectivity and concerned with self-consciousness 
and personal identity.
In the “Transcendental Deduction” of the Critique of Pure Rea-
son, Kant tries to demonstrate that the formal conditions of the pos-
sibility of experience, the categories and their validity, are not only 
necessary for self-consciousness, but also follow from the subjective 
sources of knowledge, i.e. the transcendental unity of apperception.5 
Kant’s argument is that the condition necessary for knowledge of an 
object, the concept or rule that “represents the necessary reproduc-
tion of the manifold of given intuitions, hence the synthetic unity 
in the consciousness of them” must have its transcendental ground 
in the transcendental apperception, a consciousness of the neces-
sary numerical identity of the self throughout its varied represen-
tations.6 The “necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is 
at the same time a consciousness of the equally necessary unity of 
the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts”.7 The 
unity of apperception is a necessary condition for the presentation 
of an object. And the a priori rules that are the conditions of the 
transcendental unity of apperception are also the conditions “under 
which alone something can be … thought as object as such.”8 The 
argument of the “Transcendental Deduction” is very complex and 




8. CPR A93/B125. This summative statement of the “Transcendental Deduction” is 
indebted to P. GUYER’S The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, in P. GUYER, 
The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992) 
137.
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require a special discussion. There are, however, two crucial ele-
ments to this argument which are of the main concern in this paper.
The fi rst is the claim that the unity of apperception is not just 
a requirement empirically imposed on consciousness. It is a require-
ment that can be known to hold a priori. The second crucial step 
in the argument is the move from the unity of apperception to the 
need for a priori synthesis. As Kant puts it, “the analytic unity of 
apperception is possible only under the presupposition of some syn-
thetic one.”9 This makes possible the introduction of the categories 
as the appropriately fundamental rules of synthesis. The unity of ap-
perception must thus be interpreted so as to make it plausible that it 
is underwritten by an a priori synthesis; it must be suffi ciently rich to 
support the demand for an a priori synthesis of the sort that brings in 
the categories. Thus Kant tries to secure the analytic content of the 
unity of apperception, but the way he attempts to do that is purely 
synthetic. This leads to a dilemma, the analysis and critical evalua-
tion of which I have made the main goal of this paper.
Let us fi rst briefl y consider what Kant means by “appercep-
tion” and what the main elements of his concept of the transcen-
dental unity of apperception are. It is worth noticing that Kant’s 
account of apperception differs notably from how apperception 
was understood by his predecessors (including not only Leibniz, 
but also Christian Wolff, empirical psychologists Michael Hiβmann 
and Christoph Meiners, as well as the empiricist philosopher Johann 
Bernhard Merian). However, what Kant has to say about the topic 
relates to the earlier accounts in important ways. Many philosophers 
prior to Kant argued that self-consciousness is derivative and de-
pends on the consciousness of an object (outer-directed conscious-
ness). But there were others who argued that self-consciousness is 
fundamental or “original” and does not depend on other forms of 
consciousness. Kant takes up both views. He can accommodate both 
views by drawing a distinction between empirical apperception and 
transcendental apperception, which he takes to be the two types of 
9. CPR B133.
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self-consciousness.10 Recall that Leibniz had defi ned apperception 
as a sort of inner sense, or a subjective awareness of one’s internal 
mental processes. This is a kind of apperception that Kant calls the 
empirical apperception.11 Empirical apperception is nothing more 
than the consciousness of our particular, constantly changing, tem-
porary mental states, or, as Kant puts it, the “consciousness of one-
self in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal 
perceptions [which] is merely empirical, forever variable.”12 Kant 
refers to empirical apperception as to the “empirically determined 
consciousness of my own existence.”13 We can have knowledge of 
ourselves through empirical apperception, or inner sense, but be-
cause the states of inner sense are merely phenomenal (located in 
time), inner sense provides us with knowledge of ourselves only as 
we exist as phenomena. According to Kant, it can be shown that 
empirical self-consciousness necessarily involves a consciousness of 
external objects, for “outer experience is really immediate and … 
only by means of it is inner experience possible.”14 In this sense, 
empirical apperception is dependent on empirically given material. 
It is also consciousness of some particular mental states, and as such 
cannot produce some universal representations, such as “I think.”
Kant explains that when I introspect about my inner states, I 
am having a sensory experience of a certain sort (even if an internal 
sort), but this experience is only possible if its necessary conditions 
are satisfi ed. Thus it must be something more formal or basic than 
empirical apperception which grounds this experience, and this is 
nothing other than transcendental apperception. 
In Kant, transcendental self-consciousness or apperception is 
prior to all other forms of consciousness. Kant refers to transcen-
dental apperception as an “intellectual consciousness,”15 saying that 
10. Kant is drawing this distinction in the fi rst Critique’s “Deduction of the Pure 
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it is “pure,” “original” and thus independent of all other thoughts: 
I call it pure apperception, to distinguish it from empirical apper-
ception, or, again original apperception because it is the self-con-
sciousness which, while generating the representation I think 
… cannot be accompanied by any further representation.16 
Here Kant seems to develop further the idea that was present in 
some of the earlier thinkers, such as Merian: transcendental apper-
ception is prior to outer-directed consciousness of objects and is 
independent of any such consciousness. 
Yet, Kant’s account of apperception is much richer than it 
might appear at fi rst. He does not just introduce the notion of pure 
transcendental apperception, but the most central principle of his 
transcendental epistemology becomes the principle of the transcen-
dental unity of apperception. He insists: “The transcendental unity of 
apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in 
an intuition is united in a concept of the object.”17 What does Kant 
have in mind here? One general way to think of the transcenden-
tal unity of apperception is as a formal (i.e., abstract) unity which 
all experiences must have. In particular all my experiences satisfy 
the necessary condition of belonging to me, a single consciousness; 
and the transcendental unity of apperception is Kant’s means of 
justifying this assertion, of saying how it’s possible. It is important 
that Kant do this, partly just because he knows that he has certain 
experiences and that these experiences belong to his consciousness. 
So, in the spirit of his transcendental argument, Kant shows the 
conditions that must be satisfi ed in order for the actual to be pos-
sible. An example should clarify. When I observe the Mona Lisa, I 
have a unifi ed and rich experience of the painting. What I do not 
have is, say, 100 distinctive experiences of different elements of the 
painting. But why is this the case? Kant’s answer is simple: “the 
transcendental unity of apperception” is a faculty which unifi es my 
different experiences and images of the object in the one most com-
16. CPR B132.
17. CPR B139.
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plete experience of it.
Further, Kant maintains that a priori knowledge is possible, but 
only if there is some sort of necessity involved in my experiences. 
However, it is the case that sensory experiences are contingent (i.e., 
a posteriori). For example, I might or might not be staring at a blue 
monitor. It is not plausible, however, to claim that my experiences 
are not mine; also, it is not so easy to falsify the principle of the 
transcendental unity of apperception. In short, if a priori knowledge 
is possible—and it is—then empirical apperception is not suffi cient. 
So Kant posits transcendental apperception to ground a priori know-
ledge. And this fi ts with Kant’s overall scheme to overcome Hume’s 
skepticism about knowledge. He pays particular attention to points 
in which Humean skepticism might infi ltrate (as with empirical ap-
perception), while preserving the spirit of Leibniz’s rationalism (for 
instance through a focus on a priori nature of the apperception). 
Yet, this becomes even more complicated. Kant distinguishes 
between the “identity of apperception” or the “analytic unity of ap-
perception” and the “original synthetic unity of apperception.”18 
He argues that the analytic unity of apperception is possible only 
by virtue of a synthesis or combination of representations: a multi-
plicity of representations can belong to the same I only if they are 
combined in one consciousness. 
Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given 
representations in one consciousness, that it is possible for me to 
represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations 
itself, i.e., the analytical unity of apperception is only possible 
under the presupposition of some synthetic one.19
 
And Kant holds that this “necessary synthesis of representations” is 
the most fundamental a priori condition of knowledge.20 Kant makes 
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unity of apperception is ultimately an analytic unity (of a manifold 
of representations in me), it depends on a synthetic unity (of repre-
sentations that have to be combined in a single I (one consciousness) 
for my experience to be intelligible). This applies to the transcen-
dental unity of apperception in that I can only unite a manifold of 
representations in my consciousness if I can represent to myself the 
identity of my consciousness in these very representations. I leave 
my mark of subjective consciousness on each of my representations; 
traces of my subjective consciousness are united with my representa-
tions from the manifold. And this unity is just a synthetic unity in 
which my concepts corresponding to these representations (allow-
ing me not merely to perceive but also to think) occur simultane-
ously in me. I am connecting all my representations at once. Fur-
thermore, as it is well known, Kant does not accept the possibility 
of intellectual intuition as a function of human cognition. He holds 
that humans are capable only of sensible intuition, so there is no 
receptivity without sensibility.21 Thus he argues that since humans 
have no ability to intuit the manifold without sensation, the synthe-
sis of representations is a necessary condition for the (analytic) unity 
of apperception. What unifi es our experience is that we (each of us 
individually) can think of our representations as ours, which presup-
poses reliance on the transcendental unity of apperception. This is 
what Kant means, when he states that it must be possible for the “I 
think” to accompany all of my representations. 
By introducing the “I think” as the benchmark of the transcen-
dental unity of apperception, Kant emphasizes the most original 
and fundamental function of thinking, which consists in unifying 
objects of perpetual experience and recognizing them under specifi c 
concepts. All other modes of thinking, including mathematical, sci-
entifi c, and even logical thinking, are necessarily based upon it, and, 
in this sense, depend on it for their success. 
The kind of unity introduced by the thought “I think” in the 
statement above is not an abstract unity, but the principle in ques-
tion simply states that the essence of I-hood (or mineness) lies in 
21. CPR B135.
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the assertion of my own self-identity, i.e., that consciousness and 
thin king presupposes self-consciousness. In order for me to count 
(or to recognize) a representation as mine, I have to be conscious 
of myself or identify myself as Me (the I). Thus, in Kant’s “Tran-
scendental Deduction,” the statement “I think [which] must be 
able to accompany all my representations” serves to express the 
(self)-identity of the subject that has a variety of thoughts about 
objects of perceptual experience and commits him (the subject) 
to the unity and consistency of his thoughts about those objects. 
However, such immediate self-identity should not be understood 
along the lines of Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum.” When Kant states 
that a representation is mine only if it can be accompanied by the 
thought “I think,” he does not say that a representation that is 
mine is accompanied by the certainty of my own existence. What 
is under consideration here is the activity of thought, or more pre-
cisely, the very action of self-consciousness, that is, its cognition 
of itself, and not any sort of substance of the same. Kant himself 
reminds us that the being of transcendental apperception is noth-
ing other than its activity.22 Kant seems to hold that the concept 
of self-consciousness contains the thought of a groundless subject 
(the pure I), whose very form is just its spontaneous cognizing 
activity. Kant contends that we are not justifi ed in ascribing either 
phenomenal or noumenal substantiality (thinghood) to transcen-
dental apperception. Transcendental apperception is not itself a 
possible object of experience. But as an act that unifi es representa-
tions, the unity of transcendental apperception is the ground of 
both objects of experience that is external to the cognizing subject 
as well as to empirical self-consciousness, though, as Kant insists, 
the former is not identical to the latter. 
2. FICHTE’S SELF-POSITING I
I turn now to a discussion of Fichte’s treatment of issues relevant to 
Kant’s principle of “I think.” 
22. CPR A108.
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One of the most troublesome consequences of Kant’s Criti-
cal philosophy appears to be the sharp division between the sen-
sible world and the intelligible world. By virtue of its reliance on 
the thing-in-itself, mind becomes cut off from the sensible world, 
causing a rift between the concept and intuition. The problem of 
how to overcome the dichotomy of concept and intuition plagued 
post-Kantian Critical philosophy, largely defi ning Fichte’s own 
search for a foundational principle of the system that would justify 
the unity of the two. Taking seriously the need to connect the sen-
sible and the intelligible worlds, he formulates the principle of the 
self-positing I. In the 1797 “Second Introduction” to the Wissen-
schaftslehre, Fichte reveals that in his development of the self-positing 
I, which could unite these two “worlds,” he builds on Kant’s “pure 
apperception,” which had the potential to unite sensibility and con-
ceptuality. But Kant, he argues, had not made the most of this.23 
Fichte clarifi es that what allows the I to unite (at least temporarily) 
these separate spheres is the I’s active experience of itself, its self-
reference. He, however, warns that the self-positing I has neither 
any substantial quality nor is it caused by an external object, as this 
would make the I the kind of causal “thing” or fact that he must avoid 
in order to respond to the challenges of the Critical philosophy. And 
indeed, a fundamental corollary of Fichte’s understanding of the I as 
a kind of fact/act is his denial that the I is originally any sort of “thing” 
or “substance.” Instead, the I is simply what it posits itself to be, and 
thus its “being” is, so to speak, a consequence of its self-positing, or 
rather, is co-terminus with the same. It is worth noticing that in such 
an interpretation of his fi rst principle, Fichte seems clearly to rely on 
Kant and his concept of transcendental apperception, to which, as 
we saw, must not be ascribed the status of thinghood. But this is cer-
tainly not an accidental coincidence. As we proceed, we will identify 
more instances of important similarities between Fichte’s principle 
of the self-positing I and Kant’s assessment of the unity of appercep-
tion as expressible by the propositional attitude “I think.”
23. J. G. FICHTE, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings, trans. and 
ed. by D. Breazeale (Hackett, Indianapolis, 1994) 56. (SW I: 472.)
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But before I continue tracing the similarities, I would like to 
briefl y comment on what is considered to be a major disagreement 
between Kant and Fichte in, their attitude toward intellectual intui-
tion. The question that I would like to address here is whether the 
claim of the lack of correspondence between Kant and Fichte on 
the issue of the intellectual intuition is indeed warranted and, if so, 
then to what degree.
In the same “Second Introduction” of 1797 already referenced 
above, Fichte remarks: “the Wissenschaftslehre sets out from an in-
tellectual intuition, namely, an intellectual intuition of the absolute 
self-activity of the I.”24 At the same time Fichte agrees with Kant 
that all our intuitions must be apprehended by means of the senses, 
which is the reason Kant rejects the possibility of intellectual in-
tuition as a function of human cognition. Does Fichte contradict 
himself? 
In fact, the Fichtean notion of intellectual intuition is abso-
lutely fundamental to his version of the transcendental philosophy, 
which is for him nothing else but a thinking about thought, or 
a “Wissen von Wissen” (=Wissenschaftslehre). But what does this 
“thin king about thought” comprise? This is a refl ective activity, 
which is certainly fundamentally different from our regular per-
ception of the world. The refl ection on thought does not equally 
consist of sensible intuitions and their determination by the un-
derstanding. However, as we may be empirically aware (have intui-
tions) of our surrounding, we may also become aware of thought 
(e.g. we can notice a transition in thought, etc.). But these two 
kinds of awareness differ in their nature. In order to distinguish 
the latter from the former, Fichte calls the latter intellectual in-
tuition. He explains that “the intellectual intuition of which the 
Wissenschaftslehre speaks is not directed toward any sort of being 
whatsoever; instead, it is directed at an acting—and this is some-
thing that Kant does not even mention (except, perhaps, under the 
name ‘pure apperception’).”25 
24. J. G. FICHTE, Introductions cit., 54-55.
25. J. G. FICHTE, Introductions cit., 56.
MARINA BYKOVA
158 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 52/1 (2019) 145-165
The intellectual intuition that Kant rejected was an intuition of 
a sensible object, but performed by the intellect alone, thus bypas-
sing the senses. And Fichte agrees that this sort of intuition cannot 
withstand a critique: “the immediate consciousness of the thing in 
itself” is “a complete perversion of reason, an utterly unreasonable 
concept.”26 Yet Fichte is here concerned not with our perception of 
the objects of the external world, but rather with the special activity, 
which is consciousness. As Fichte points out, Kant did hint at such a 
form of consciousness but never explicitly discussed it.27 
When Kant rejected the possibility of intellectual intuition, 
he considered the following three usages of the term: (1) an in-
tellect that applies concepts to what comes to the senses with-
out the mediation of the pure forms of space and time, i.e.an imme-
diate awareness of things in themselves, (2) the intuition that would 
create its own object, and (3) the intuition of the whole experience, 
one that surpasses our limited and discursive point of view. Fichte’s 
intellectual intuition concerns none of these. 
The intellectual intuition that Fichte proposes is some-
thing that must necessarily be thought in addition to sensible intui-
tion. What is under consideration here is the self-regulative activi-
ties of consciousness. Knowledge of such activity cannot be given 
in experience, because it is only by virtue of this activity that we 
can have experience in the fi rst place. This knowledge is not given 
in ordinary experience, neither can it be merely deduced from it. 
Whatever the status of this knowledge is, it is not empirical. Yet 
despite our inability to associate its form and status with any of the 
empirical properties, we do possess this knowledge. Thus, Fichte 
concludes that such a knowledge must then be given in an intel-
lectual intuition. The existence (be it even implicit) of immediate 
knowledge of the rules of our self-legislation of experience must be 
a necessary assumption, and Kant could not deny this too. 
What is intuited in sensible intuition is fi xed, passive and or-
dinarily in space; but all that is intuited in our intellectual intui-
26. J. G. FICHTE, Introductions cit., 56. (SW 1:472.)
27. Ibidem.
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tion is acting. Fichte is confi dent that Kant too has such an intuition, 
but he never refl ected upon it. Indeed, his entire philosophy is a 
product of this intuition, for he maintained that necessary repre-
sentations are products of the action of a rational being and are not 
passively received. But this is something that he could have come 
to realize only by means of an intuition.28 Kant could not deny this 
form of intuition because our awareness of the synthetic unity of 
apperception could never be derived from empirical consciousness. 
Rather, it is what fi rst makes it possible.29 And indeed Kant writes: 
“That representation [“I think”] that can be given prior to all think-
ing is called intuition”.30 But, as Fichte notes, Kant did not com-
ment and refl ect on the status of such knowledge claims, i.e., on the 
precise status of transcendental knowledge. 
I will not delve into further details concerning Fichte’s response 
to the possible forms of intellectual intuition identifi ed by Kant.31 For 
Fichte’s concept of intellectual intuition per se is not of main interest 
to me here. Rather my goal here is (1) to show that Fichte uses the 
term “intellectual intuition” in a different sense than the one given in 
Kant’s articulation of transcendental idealism and (2) to demonstrate 
the ways in which Fichte shared a position already presented by Kant 
by advancing it further into a new original principle of the self-posited 
I. What should be clear based on the above discussion is that Fichte’s 
concept of intellectual intuition is not only inspired by but fi rmly 
rooted in Kant’s philosophy of transcendental apperception. 
28. J. G. FICHTE, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova 
methodo (1769/99), translated and edited by Daniel Breazeale (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1992) 32.
29. CPR B130-131. 
30. Ibidem. B132. 
31. For a more detailed discussion of Kant’s and Fichte’s accounts of intellectual 
intuition see F. BEISER, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivity 
(Harvard University Press, London, 2002), esp. Ch. V; M. FRANK, “Intellektuale 
Anschauung.” Drei Stellungnahmen zu eimen Deutungsversuch von Selbstbewußtsein: 
Kant, Fichte, Hölderlin/Novalis, in E. BEHLER, J. HÖRISCH, Die Aktualität der 
Frühromantik (Schöningh, Paderborn, 1987) 96-126; D. BREAZEALE, Fichte‘s Nova 
Methodo Phenomenologica: On the methodological role of „intellectual intuition“ in the 
later Jena Wissenschafslehre, “Revue Internationale de Philosophie” 52/4 (1998) 
587-618. 
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The identifi cation of pure apperception with an act of the 
mind, which is evident in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, echoes in 
Fichte’s 1794 Wissenschaftslehre.32 In Fichte’s systematic philosophy, 
“the self-posited I” expresses both the I’s act of positing itself and 
the fact that the I has been thus self-posited. In some sense, what is 
posited in this act is nothing other than the existence of (what Kant 
calls) the pure I: Fichte claims that the I exists only insofar as the I 
posits itself as existing.33 Furthermore, Fichte’s account of the man-
ner in which this act makes objective consciousness possible refl ects 
the logical progression of Kant’s deduction of the categories: from 
intuition, in the productive power of imagination, and then to the 
relation that these two faculties have to the understanding and the 
cognition of objective reality. And Fichte’s overall account of the 
logical progress of consciousness appears to be very similar to one 
introduced by Kant. 
From the more systematic perspective, too, it seems that the 
difference between Kant’s assessment of the unity of consciousness 
as expressible by the propositional attitude “I think” and Fichte’s 
defi nition of the I as its own act of positing itself is primarily a dif-
ference not of content but of emphasis and approach. The later can 
be explained by the dissimilarity of the goals that each of the think-
ers pursues, which seem to be justifi able in terms of the paradigm 
shift in philosophical discourse that had occurred through the tran-
sition from Kant’s philosophical theory to post-Kantian philosophy.
Yet, while there appears to be no evident inconsistency be-
tween Fichte’s defi nition of the I as the spontaneously generated 
activity of self-positing and Kant’s account of the activity of thought 
as contained in the concept of pure apperception, Fichte’s emphasis 
on the primacy of the practical in his account of the I is perhaps 
more evident than Kant’s in the latter’s explanation of transcenden-
32. Fichte holds that the fi rst principle of human knowledge is a “Tathandlung 
which is not and cannot be found among the empirical determinations of our 
consciousness, but rather lies at the ground of all consciousness and alone makes 
it possible”. J. G. FICHTE, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (Meiner, 
Hamburg, 1997) 11.
33. J. G. FICHTE, Grundlage cit., 17.
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tal apperception. The fi rst principle of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre is 
equally “theoretical” and “practical,” insofar as the act described by 
this principle is not only a “knowing,” but also a “doing.” This spe-
cial activity is a deed as well as a cognition. What is important here 
is that both acts cannot occur in isolation from each other, since 
“the I simply posits itself” requires that the I posits both itself and 
its world and, in this way, becomes conscious of itself and its practi-
cal agency. Thus it is aware of its (transcendental) freedom and its 
practical realization. The unity of theoretical and practical reason 
(which remains problematic for Kant) is now guaranteed from the 
start, inasmuch as this very unity is a condition for the possibility 
of self-consciousness and its freedom. In this sense, Fichte’s I as the 
fi rst principle of his philosophy is not merely an epistemological 
subject, but at the same time a moral agent. This moral signifi cance 
that Fichte’s concept of the I involves is absent from Kant’s account 
in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Another point of comparison is Kant’s and Fichte’s attitudes 
toward the possibility of the existence of the unity of conscious-
ness. In deducing the necessity of the unity of consciousness, Kant 
warns that the existence of a particular subsistent unity (individual 
self-concept) is not at all secured. Fichte shares this position. In the 
“Second Introduction” to the Wissenschaftslehre he points out that 
“all that could be produced by the act of combining these many 
different representations would be a manifold act of thinking, which 
appears as a single act of thinking as such, but by no means a thinking 
subject who engages in this manifold act of thinking.”34 It appears to 
be evident that Fichte, like Kant, is skeptical about the possibility of 
asserting the existence of any particular abiding subject on the basis 
of the existence of the unifying transcendental act of consciousness. 
However, contrary to Kant, for whom pure apperception is associ-
ated with the transcendental (noumenal) subject, for Fichte the only 
actually existing and acting I as a free agent is a fi nite, empirical, 
embodied, individual self.35 Furthermore, “the I simply posits it-
34. J. G. FICHTE, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre cit., 61n.
35. On rebuttal of the widespread misunderstanding about the absolute character of 
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self,” its freedom is never “absolute” or “unlimited.” Instead, free-
dom proves to be conceivable—and hence the I itself proves to be 
possible—only as limited and fi nite. Thus, the “pure (absolute) I” 
is a mere abstraction and the only I that can actually exist or act is a 
fi nite, empirical, embodied, individual self.
The I must posit itself in order to be an I at all, but it can 
posit itself only insofar as it posits itself as limited. Moreover, it 
cannot even posit its own limitations, in the sense of producing 
or creating these limits. The fi nite I (the intellect) cannot be the 
ground of its own passivity. Instead, according to Fichte’s analysis, 
if the I is to posit itself at all, it must simply discover itself to be lim-
ited, a discovery that Fichte characterizes as an Anstoß (“check”) to 
the free, practical activity of the I. However, the activity required 
from the I is not an ordinary practical activity that allows the I to 
encounter and overcome (transcend) the “check” upon its own ac-
tivity. Since the limitation presented by the Anstoß is itself posited 
by the I’s activity (I posits for itself its own limitation), the inward 
activity of the I must be present as well. Moreover, it must be pre-
supposed as the I’s own rational agency, which is caused internally. 
The I cannot be free and conscious of itself as a free agent without 
setting its own limit and then recognizing and transcending its 
own boundaries. 
Yet, the act of setting a “limit” for oneself is an intellectually 
conscious activity, which necessarily requires the presence of cog-
nition in the fi rst place. Thus, although Fichte demonstrates that 
the “task of limiting itself” (since a real “check” on the I’s activity) 
is a condition for the possibility of consciousness, he is not able to 
explain its actual occurrence without falling into the logical circle. 
Only much later, in the § 13 of his Wissenshaftslehre nova methodo36 
Fichte will recognize this circle as the circle of consciousness in 
which the I fi nds itself trapped. As the way out of this circle, he 
the I in Fichte and for the detailed analyses of the fi nitude of the Fichtean self, 
see D. BREAZEALE, Check or Checkmate? On the Finitude of the Fichtean Self, in K. 
AMERIKS, D. STURMA (eds.), The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classic 
German Philosophy (SUNY, Albany, 1995) 98-102.
36. J. G. FICHTE, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy cit., 285-286.
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points to the intelligible realm of freedom, the original volition, 
which is prior to all empirical willing and empirical cognition. This 
“pure” volition is a categorical demand for action, an “ought” or 
internal urge for an engagement with the world, in both a theoreti-
cal and a practical fashion. This idea has important implications for 
Fichte’s conception of a free agency and freedom in general. 
3. CONCLUSION
Let us now go back to our central topic and draw some (still pre-
liminary) conclusions. From the above discussion it should be evi-
dent that Fichte’s principle of the self-positing I is not merely in-
spired by Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception expressible 
by the propositional attitude “I think.” Rather, it appears to be a 
kind of conceptual descendent of it. Indeed, as in Kant, the prin-
ciple in question refers to the most fundamental function of think-
ing, while in Fichte the activity of “self-positing” is taken to be the 
fundamental feature of the I-hood in general. And in both Kant 
and Fichte, the fi rst principle expresses a peculiar kind of unity. 
Fichte refers to it as to the original unity of self-consciousness: a 
unity that is presupposed by and contained within every fact and 
every act of empirical consciousness, though it never appears as such 
therein (Tathandlung). However, we should be careful to not simply 
identify or reduce Fichte’s principle of self-posited I to the Kant’s 
concept of the transcendental unity of apperception. In his form of 
transcendental idealism, Kant assigns this single concept two im-
portant functions: (1) it justifi es the permanence and coherence of 
the (transcendental) subject, and (2) it explains how the manifold 
contents of sensory intuition can be synthesized to produce a com-
bined unifi ed notion. Fichte, however, refuses to attribute this kind 
of functionality to his principle of the self-positing I. Instead, he 
immediately separates the functions of permanence and synthesis to 
account for the fi nite, empirical self.37 While for Kant, the subject 
37. For more insights about irreducibility of Fichte’s view of the self to Kant’s concept 
of subject depicted in his concept of the transcendental unity of apperception see 
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in question is still an abstract, transcendental “ego” akin Descartes’ 
subject, the pure mind in its epistemological exploration, the I of the 
Wissenschaftslehre is a real, embodied self, practically engaged with 
the objects of the empirical reality. Fichte’s I is not just the fact of 
transcendental apperception. It is also, and to the greater degree, 
the primordial activity that initiates and spontaneously generates 
moral striving in the world. What is posited as the starting point of 
the Wissenschaftslehre is not just a concept of subject or the abstract 
idea of pure selfhood, but the actual self that is always striving for a 
self-determinacy, which is possible only through a concrete interac-
tion with the world of objects and other selves. The very process of 
striving is the real history of actual consciousness that Fichte seeks 
to reconstruct in his transcendental philosophy.
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